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ABSTRACT
Exploding growth along the Colorado Front Range has expanded the wildland-urban
interface-the area where homes and vegetation mix. This area, known as the WUI, is
at high risk of wildfires. Wildfire risk is based on both natural conditions, such as
invasive species and climate change, and human development decisions that allow
continued growth in fire-prone areas. This thesis examines the approaches to wildfire
risk mitigation taken by six counties along the Front Range. I argue that these
mitigation approaches are effective but do not tackle important aspects of the wildfire
problem, including who pays and how risks continue to increase. Counties should
minimize development in the WUI by adopting strong policies that incorporate the full
costs of fire protection into local jurisdictional budgets and address growth management
in the WUI. This requires a greater incorporation of the land-use planning process into
decisions that put people and property at risk to wildfire.
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INTRODUCTION
The Colorado Front Range, a term that describes the geographic area that spans the
most populous region of Colorado, offers what many residents find to be the best of all
worlds: quick access to outdoor recreation, a variety of housing choices, well-ranked
universities, job opportunities, and a vibrant community of active adults, youth and
families-all against a scenic backdrop of the Rocky Mountain foothills and year-round
sunshine. It's no wonder that western regions like this one are booming with new
residents seeking to enjoy their amenities (Martin et al. 2008). According to the U.S.
Census Bureau, Colorado's population grew more than 30 percent between 1990 and
2000 and reached 4.7 million by 2007.
As some newcomers fill in the cities, others are migrating into the forested
foothills-an area also known as the wildland-urban interface, or WUI (pronounced woo-
ee). Reasons for moving into the WUI vary: some want to escape the bustle of the city,
be closer to nature, or retire in a different setting; others are attracted by low-priced
property or the opportunity to own a second home. Because so many people are
moving into Colorado's WUI, it ranks fourth among western U.S. states in the amount of
forested land where homes have already been built next to public lands (Anon. 2007).
Living in Colorado's WUI has a catch, however: it is a hotspot for wildfire; Front Range
ecosystems historically have experienced a range of wildfires, from frequent low-
intensity burns to less frequent but high-intensity events. Furthermore, risk levels are
increasing as a result of changing ecosystem conditions, as well as human factors such
as land-use decisions. Protecting homes in the WUI against wildfire also comes at a
steep price: the federal government's firefighting budget averages more than $1 billion
per fiscal year, the bulk of which is devoted to fighting fires in the WUI (Anon. 2007).
Escalating wildfire risks and tightening budgets at the state and federal level
prompt the following question: what efforts, if any, are being made to address wildfire
risks in the western U.S., and how effective are those efforts? In the absence of federal
or consistent state policy that regulates risk management of wildfire hazard, most
wildfire planning occurs at the county level. A close examination of wildfire policies in
six counties along the Colorado Front Range-Boulder, Clear Creek, Douglas,
Jefferson, Larimer, and Teller-reveals that the answers are not straightforward. I
chose these six counties because all have significant WUI populations in Colorado's
"red zone"-the area designated by the Colorado State Forest Service as interface
areas at high risk of wildfires (see Appendix A). In addition, the six counties share
geographic and ecosystem similarities that contribute to their wildfire hazard ranking.
Each approaches wildfire risks through some combination of regulatory ordinances,
building codes, fuel reduction programs, and other community outreach efforts. But the
counties vary in important ways as well; they have different land-use and development
patterns, wildfire histories, and staffing resources-all of which have influenced how
they implement wildfire mitigation plans. Other issues, such as state land-use laws,
skewed economic-growth incentives, past wildfire policy, insurance costs that are
unequally distributed among taxpayers, differing risk perceptions and attitudes
regarding wildfires, and private property rights also play a role in how counties regulate
and plan for wildfire hazards in their area. The amalgamation of these issues makes
clear that wildfire risk management is complex. What also emerges is that wildfire
mitigation techniques can reduce wildfire risks, but do nothing to limit the growing
number of people moving into wildfire-prone areas. Ultimately, stronger links to the
long-range planning process are necessary as Colorado faces increasing wildfire risks.
COLORADO'S WILDFIRE EXPERIENCE
The Colorado Front Range has experienced a range of wildfires in the past century that
have shaped how it approaches the growing wildfire threat. From small to large,
wildfires have had social, economic, and environmental impacts that have prompted
decision makers to take part in risk management-a process that includes hazard
identification, risk measurement, and vulnerability assessments. Risk management
helps decision makers eliminate, reduce, or avoid wildfire risks. In the six Colorado
Front Range counties, risk management occurs through a variety of mitigation
programs, outreach, education and regulations designed to reduce wildfire risk to
people, property, and ecosystems.
From Natural Hazard to Natural Disaster
Wildfire is one of many natural hazards that Colorado experiences on a regular basis.
Tornadoes, rockfalls, severe winter storms, drought, flooding, mudslides, blizzards,
hailstorms, avalanches, and landslides are all regular occurrences as well. These
natural events typically result from geologic, atmospheric, or hydrologic activity, and can
actually enhance the natural environment. For example, wildfires that are low to
moderate in severity bring a variety of ecological benefits to their surroundings. Fire
promotes tree reproduction, clears undergrowth, enhances biodiversity, and replenishes
soils (Wuerthner 2006).
On the other hand, severe wildfires-like those seen in Colorado's 2002 fire
season-have an intensity that has long-term adverse consequences. When fires burn
too hot, they sterilize the soil, burn entire stands of trees, and leave an area susceptible
to erosion (Wuerthner 2006). The aftermath is also devastating. Erosion threatens
watersheds, where increased sediment from the surrounding slopes may drain into
reservoirs, affecting water quality. In several counties along the Colorado Front
Range-Teller, Clear Creek, and Boulder, for example-minerals may also become
exposed during intense wildfire. With the next rainfall, these exposed minerals can
leach into the water supply and cause dangerous contaminant levels. In addition to
environmental impacts, consequences extend to the social and economic realms.
Large-scale displacement of people during a wildfire evacuation, charred timber
harvests, structural loss, threatened personal safety, tourist and recreational impacts,
hunting limitations, highway closures, and required post-fire restoration landscape
planning are among the costs of a wildfire event. When these types of human
consequences unfold, a natural hazard becomes a natural disaster.
The Hayman Fire, the most catastrophic fire in Colorado's recorded history,
illustrates these impacts. On June 8, 2002, arson resulted in a fire that crossed over its
campfire boundary and spread to the surrounding forest.' Already experiencing a
serious drought, Colorado's parched vegetation enabled the Hayman Fire to spread
rapidly through the surrounding Pike-San Isabel National Forest, thirty miles southwest
'Terry Barton, a 38-year-old Colorado woman and US Forest Service employee, burned in anger a letter
from her estranged husband, in violation of a ban on fires in the drought-stricken Pike National Forest.
She thought the fire had been extinguished and left it only to find later that it was spreading (Anon. 2002).
of Denver. The National Interagency Fire Center (NIFC) promptly issued a Red Flag
Warning as high wind and low humidity was predicted to continue. Over the next three
weeks, the Hayman fire burned through parts of five counties, including Douglas, Teller,
and Jefferson. Thick ash in the air spread throughout the entire Denver metropolitan
area. At midday, cars driving in downtown Denver during required headlights. During
its most intense period, the Hayman fire spread as much as a half-mile in four minutes,
charring more than 60,000 acres in one day. In total, more than 138,000 acres burned,
and 133 homes, one commercial building, and 466 outbuildings (e.g., sheds, garages,
or other small detached structures) were lost (Anon. 2003). According to the Hayman
Fire Burned Area Emergency Stabilization and Rehabilitation (BAER) Report, 44,000
acres (32 percent of the total) burned at high severity (Anon. 2003).
A report issued by the Pinchot Institute for Conservation (2007), a national
conservation organization in Washington D.C., estimated the fire suppression costs for
the Hayman fire at $39 million and structural damage costs at $238 million. The report
also assessed the extent to which Colorado's watersheds were affected. Roughly 56
percent of the area burned by the Hayman Fire drains directly into Cheesman
Reservoir, which supplies 15 percent of metropolitan Denver's water supply. During the
fire, this reservoir filled up with mud, ash, and decomposed granite. This sediment
poured into the reservoir during rainstorms following the fire and remains a threat to the
reservoir, incurring significant annual maintenance costs (Anon. 2007). Almost six
years later, infrastructure in Teller County, including roads and bridges also continues to
wash out during periods of heavy rain (Garren 2008). The entire Hayman fire burn area
remained closed for general recreation use until early May 2003. Property values in the
area also fell; for example, the Jefferson County assessor's office assessed property 50
percent lower for burned acreages and up to 100 percent lower for burned structures
(Kent et al. 2003).
Although the Hayman fire's severity was unprecedented, other fires throughout
the Front Range have carried significant social, environmental, and economic impacts.
In 1989 Boulder County's Black Tiger Fire burned 44 homes and charred over 2,000
acres of forested land just fives miles west of the city of Boulder. In 1996 Jefferson
County experienced the Buffalo Creek Fire, which burned over 10,000 acres and
resulted in two deaths in post fire-related flooding (CSFS 2002). During the 2000 fire
season, Colorado experienced four separate WUI fires along the Front Range that
destroyed 74 structures and threatened thousands more. These fires interrupted utility
service and impacted water and air quality. The total cost to state coffers for
suppressing the fires during 2000 alone was over $10 million (CSFS 2002).
Wildfire Risk in Colorado's WUI
Colorado has experienced numerous wildfires because many parts of the state are at
high risk to wildfire. This risk is a result of both natural conditions and human factors.
Fuel buildup (sticks, stumps, logs, and undergrowth), terrain, and climate satisfy a
wildfire's three requirements for sustaining itself: fuel, heat, and oxygen. Human
interference with the environment, including land-use decisions and forest management,
can trigger or exacerbate wildfires, increasing their severity and/or frequency (McGuire
et al. 2002).
Colorado's arid climate and mountainous terrain predispose it to wildfire. As the
Front Range meets the Rocky Mountains, steep slopes and elevations range from 6,000
to 8,500 feet. Wind channeling through canyons makes fire behavior more
unpredictable and difficult to fight. Flames on hillsides spread more rapidly and
erratically than wildfires on flat terrain. Common vegetation consists primarily of
Douglas-fir, Spruce-fir, Aspen, Lodgepole pine, Ponderosa pine, and a diversity of
shrubs, grasses, and wildflowers, including scattered oak shrublands, sagebrush, and
pinyon-juniper woodland. Much of this vegetation, excluding Aspen, is typically
characterized as "fire-dependent"-vegetation now resilient to or dependent upon
wildfire for health and tree reproduction (Pyne 1982). Other natural features and
conditions of these montane and subalpine ecosystems that increase wildfire frequency
include low annual precipitation and dry lightning storms. When combined with
seasonal droughts and high wind conditions, risk climbs steeply. Dry lightning storms
make counties such as Teller and Clear Creek particularly vulnerable; Teller County has
one of the highest instances of lightning strikes in the continental United States. Making
matters worse, when fires start in remote or undeveloped areas it may be difficult to
immediately detect them.
The last few centuries have changed forest conditions and have altered fire
regimes--that is, the periodicity and pattern of naturally occurring fires in a particular
area or vegetative type, described in terms of frequency, biological severity, and area
extent (Schwab and Meck 2005). When European settlers moved into the Front Range
region of Colorado they introduced cattle grazing. Grazing changed the fuel types in a
way that changed fire behavior. When fires started, they no longer spread as far into
the wooded environments as they had in the past before increased grazing because
cattle chewed down the grasses which would normally allow surface fires to spread.
This resulted in an accumulation of fuels in the forests (Pyne 2001). Another reason
that fuels accumulated was the "10 a.m." policy that the Forest Service used during the
1930s through the 1970s-a suppression policy that required every forest fire reported
to be under control by the next morning. This policy was a reaction to previous forest
fires such as the Great Fires of 1910 that burned throughout Oregon, Washington,
Montana, Idaho, California, South Dakota, and Nebraska, affecting more than four
million acres (Schwab and Meck 2005).
More recent land-use decisions, such as development patterns, also contribute to
wildfire risk. Simply developing in areas that are already prone to fire adds more fuel
through the increased number of structures; structures can catch on fire and contribute
to wildfire severity; prescribed fire is more difficult with increased residents in areas that
traditionally relied on wildfire for forest health; and residents contribute to the buildup of
excess fuel if they allow overgrowth on their property. Adding to this risk is the variety
of development configurations. Subdivisions in the WUI often have limited access and
structures can be sited in a way that increases their vulnerability.2 This makes
firefighting more complex, and is one of the reasons firefighters must have special
training on wildfire behavior in these different environments.
2 Clustered communities such as subdivisions that abut a forest or wildland edge are known as the
"boundary" WUI. This is the most classic kind of wildland-urban interface. A second WUI type the
"intermix," where structures are scattered throughout a wildland area. Finally, an "island" WUI is an area
of wildland surrounded by an urban environment. Such islands occur as tracts of land are left
undeveloped, vacant, or intentionally preserved as a park within a community. Most common in Colorado
is the intermix (State of Colorado Department of Emergency Management 2000). Despite these broad
categories, the actual definition can vary by community, depending on how the community defines its
WUI boundaries and vegetation conditions (Schwab and Meck 2005).
Despite the growing risk of wildfire in Colorado, development in the WUI
continues.3 Recent research from Headwaters Economics (2007), an independent,
nonprofit research group, estimates that Colorado has almost 95,000 residences in its
WUI, of which 38 percent are either seasonal homes or cabins. The largest WUI area in
Colorado runs along the Colorado Front Range, spanning the counties of Larimer,
Boulder, Gilpin, Clear Creek, Jefferson, Douglas, Park, Teller, El Paso, Fremont (see
Appendix A for a map of Interface Areas of High Wildfire Risk in Colorado). Colorado's
WUI has mushroomed in recent years and is predicted to continue growing. A recent
Colorado State University analysis projects that the state's WUI will increase from
715,500 acres in 2000 to 2,161,499 acres in 2030 (2007). While this 300 percent
increase in growth is not limited to the Colorado Front Range, the WUI will continue to
be stretched in this region. Similar data from Headwaters Economics (2007) shows that
Colorado has nearly 2,000 square miles of forested private land that borders public
wildlands, 79 percent of which has yet to be developed. From 1990 to 2000, explosive
population growth along the Front Range was a major contributor to the growth in
homes at risk to wildfires. Douglas County, for instance, grew from 60,391 to 175,766
people between 1990 and 2000. This whopping 191 percent growth resulted in an
estimated $22 billion worth of community assets made vulnerable to wildfire risk,
including residential, commercial, industrial, agricultural, religious, government,
education, and public assets (Colorado Division of Emergency Management 2007).
Other Front Range counties also experienced significant increases in WUI population,
as shown in the table below.
3 Whether or not a community is classified as part of the WUI is not static; rather, WUls expand with
added homes in the forested areas
Population growth rates have slowed since 2000, but counties in the Colorado
Front Range forecast continued growth in coming years. Between the 2000 and 2007
period, the state saw an additional 13 percent more new residents along the urban
Front Range corridor (US Census Bureau, 2007). Moreover, homes that are being
added are at much lower densities than other lands in the West---housing in Colorado's
WUI consumes a 4.9 acres per person, compared to the 0.5 acres per person average
on other western private lands (Anon. 2007). This means that Colorado is consuming
more land at a faster pace, making a larger impact on the size of their WUI as
compared to other states.
i'opuiation
(1990)
Population
(2000)
Population
(2007)
Population
Forecast 2020
Percent Change
in Population
from 1990-2000
Percent Change
in Population
from 2000-2007
Percent Change
2000-2020
291,288
290,262
344,596
+29.3%
-.35%
+18%
/,61 V
9,322
8,956
12,675
+22.4%
-3.93%
+36%
6U,391
175,766
272,117
414,633
+191%
+54.82%
+136%
436,43U
527,056
529,354
607,417
+20.2%
+.44%
+15%
186,136b
251,494
281,620
366,240
+35.1%
+11.98%
+46%
12,468
20,555
21,824
30,841
+64.9%
+6.17%
+50%
Sources: Annual Estimates of the Population of Combined Statistical Areas: April 1, 2000 to July 1,2007 (CSV). 2007 Population Estimates; United States Census Bureau, Population Division (2008-03-27). Retrieved on 2008-03-27; Colorado Division of Emergency Management 2007).
Wildfire Risk Management In the Front Range
Past wildfires, WUI growth, extended drought and other increasing risk conditions have
motivated many communities to address their wildfire risk. Decision makers at the
county level have an array of risk management options to choose from, some of which
-
are supported by state and federal programs.4 County approaches typically focus on
fuel treatment programs, structural requirements, and subdivision design and access.
The implementation of these mitigation techniques may be in the form of legal
requirements such as building and zoning code regulations, or outreach efforts,
including education campaigns, community plans, and other voluntary initiatives. Many
of the Front Range counties have comparable mitigation approaches, with the exception
of Teller County. The following discussion provides an overview of the general
approach that the counties take, including a few noteworthy highlights, and also
analyzes what sets Teller County apart. For a more detailed analysis of each county's
wildfire risk management information, refer to Appendix B.
At the outset of the wildfire risk management process for any county is a hazard
assessment. Hazard assessments identify and analyze where wildfire risk is greatest.
These can be performed at the state, county, subdivision, or site level. The results are
an effective tool for decision makers (e.g., planners, fire officials, land managers, and
developers) to utilize in the development process. In 2002 the Colorado State Forest
Service partnered with the U.S. Forest Service, the Bureau of Land Management, and
other state and federal agencies to perform a Colorado Wildland-Urban Interface
Hazard (WUI) Assessment. The final product was a map that showed varying degrees
of fire hazard throughout the state and within individual counties. The map was
4 In October 2000 Congress passed the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 (DMA 2000). This act amended
the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act of 1989 and began requiring all
states to update their hazard mitigation plans in order for states and local governments to continue
receiving financial and technical assistance for natural hazards. Following the DMA 2000, the Colorado
Division of Emergency Management (CDEM)--the state agency with the statutory responsibility to update
and revise the Colorado Natural Hazards portion of the state's mitigation plan--has updated its plan
annually. The state mitigation plan includes a wildfire section that provides updated wildfire and WUI
information and reflects progress on recommendations stemming back to a task force convened by the
governor in 2001.
generated using Geographic Information Systems (GIS) technology, and relied on data
that included the probability of lightning strikes in a given area, vegetative and
topological features that affect fire intensity and rate of spread (e.g., slope and fuel
type), and housing density. This hazard assessment, which places communities at high
wildfire risk in 'the red zone,' was instrumental in raising awareness of wildfire risk
throughout the state (see Appendix A) (Wolf 2003).
The state's hazard assessment also provided many counties with a foundation
for further analysis within their own jurisdictional boundaries. Several counties have
since performed detailed hazard assessments to analyze wildfire risk at the parcel,
neighborhood, or community level. Larimer County, for instance, analyzed its 1,689,600
acres using GIS and determined that over 11,000 platted parcels exist within the
county's designated Wildfire Hazard Area-structures are present on about half of these
parcels. Larimer County also performed a subdivision wildfire hazard assessment on all
of its subdivisions, ranking wildfire threat from low to extreme. This will help the county
target their wildfire risk management programs more effectively. Detailed hazard
assessments have also allowed counties to adopt overlay districts or zones based on
wildfire risk. s5 This tool can be useful during the site plan review process-a wildfire
hazard overlay zone or district enables planners to assess what type of mitigation work
s For example, Douglas County has designated a Wildfire Hazard Overlay (WFH) District. All new
development applications that are in this district, including accessory structures such as barns, garages,
and sheds, are for assessed for their level of wildfire risk. All mitigation requirements must be completed
before a Certificate of Occupancy is issued. Similarly, Larimer County's Wildland Fire Hazard Area
requires all new building construction and new land development to meet wildland fire mitigation codes
and regulations. Larimer County's Land-use Code (Chapter 8.3) requires the applicant to submit a
wildfire mitigation plan (including a report and maps portraying the extent and severity of the wildfire
hazard at the particular site (Section 8.3.8.C.5.). Jefferson, Boulder, Clear Creek and Douglas County
use similar language. Boulder County requires that mitigation plan inspections are completed prior to the
foundation inspections (including completion of all mitigation work).
will be required. This mitigation work is then tied to the building permit or certificate of
occupancy-a sure way to see that the mitigation work is performed.
In terms of the mitigation work that is typically performed to reduce wildfire risk,
decision makers and community members choose some combination of mechanical
operations, structural requirements, and other site and subdivision regulations. The
reason for selecting these mitigation techniques is simple: they have been shown to
reduce wildfire risk to people and property. For example, fuel thinning--the process of
removing excess, dead, or overgrown vegetation on a lot or area-reduces the chances
of a large wildfire spreading to a home and also decreases a fire's strength. Without
this fuel, wildfire is kept to the surface level only and burns with less severity through an
area. Well-planned subdivisions increase residents' ability to evacuate, allow fire trucks
quick entrance, and reduce a structure's ignitability. Regulations that locate homes
away from heavily vegetated areas, such as public forests, and are sited on level
property (away from ridge tops, canyons, or other similar areas) are less likely to find
themselves in a wildfire's path. Finally, using fire-safe building materials drastically
reduces the likelihood that traveling embers or radiant heat will cause a structure to
burn from within as a wildfire passes through the vicinity. Research documents the
effectiveness of these mitigation techniques. The Stanford Research Institute studied
the results of the Belair-Brentwood wildfire (CA) in 1961 and found that 95 percent of
homes survived where vegetation clearance of 10 to 18 meters (32 to 59 feet) was
maintained around the homes (given that the homes also had non-flammable roofs)
(Cohen 1999). Studies following the Panorama Fire in 1990 (San Bernardino, CA) and
the 1991 Spokane, WA fires also found those homes which burned most frequently
were from firebrand ignitions on flammable roofs (Cohen 1999).
Due to their effectiveness, each of the Front Range counties (excluding Teller)
requires structural and fuel thinning mitigation in their county building and zoning codes.
In a regulatory context, thinning performed on a homeowner's lot is referred to as
"defensible space" or the "home ignition zone." Defensible space requirements divide a
homeowner's lot into three zones, and each zone is associated with a specific degree of
fuel treatment and modification. For example, Zone 1--the area closest to the
home-is required to have all flammable vegetation cleared away from the 15 feet
surrounding the house (including decks and garages). Zones 2 and 3 also may require
tree thinning and other fuel reduction or management methods, although a homeowner
can be more selective about which trees they choose to keep. Typically, defensible
space work is required when a new development application is submitted. It may also
be required on additions, remodels and accessory structures. As part of the application
process, Jefferson, Larimer, Douglas, and Clear Creek counties require that
professional foresters perform a fuels assessment and clearing on the lot. Boulder
County gives homeowners the option of doing the mitigation work on their own. When
an applicant goes through Boulder County's development approval process, (s)he is
handed a packet of information that explains the purpose of each step in the mitigation
plan. Eric Philips, Boulder County Wildfire Mitigation Coordinator, sees this packet as
an effective means of communicating to the homeowner the seriousness of choosing to
live in a wildfire prone area (2008).
For those lots with existing homes, counties cannot enforce defensible space
through regulations but often have supporting fuels reduction programs. For example,
Clear Creek County's Site Development Department is initiating a Volunteer Defensible
Space program through the WUI Fuels Reduction Program. The program grant money,
received through the Colorado State Forest Service, can be used to assist homeowners
by providing monetary compensation for performing defensible space on one's existing
property that was not required to perform mitigation work during at the time of
development approval. The program also includes a free slash disposal by making a
wood chipper available for those participating in the program.
In addition to defensible space, counties will require fire-resistant building
materials on new development, additions and remodels. Contained in the respective
county's building code, most structural requirements adhere to the International Code
Council's requirements or those issued by the National Fire Protection Association
(NFPA). Structurally significant opportunities include: replacing wooden shake-shingle
roofs with non-flammable Class A or B roofing materials such as asphalt shingles, slate
or clay tile, metal, or tin; clearing eaves of pine needles or other flammable leaves;
enclosing foundations with concrete block, cement walls; minimizing the size and
number of windows on the side of the house most likely to be exposed to wildfire, and
covering chimneys and stove pipes with non-flammable screens.
It is also typical for counties to have a stringent set of roadway standards
designed to improve access and limit vegetation. This ensures that a proper number of
entrances and exits are available for evacuating traffic and entering fire trucks.
Driveways receive a special amount of attention in mountainous areas, for both property
owners and firefighters. Driveway preferences can be at odds: homeowners desire a
long and narrow driveway that increases privacy while firefighters need a short and wide
driveway for easy and well-marked access. Douglas County's driveway permitting
process emphasizes the importance of maintained driveways by assessing an
additional fee to the building permit when a project is in the WFH Overlay District. This
fee goes to additional mitigation work along the driveway, to clear vegetation and
ensure access. Clear Creek County, situated in the heart of Colorado's Redzone
interface, requires as part of their mitigation plan that if either road access or the
applicant's driveway does not meet county requirements an applicant must go through
the Wildfire Hazard Mitigation Point System. The Point System Agreement was
developed to help the property owner achieve the additional mitigation necessary for
allowing a development application to receive approval.
Additional regulatory requirements may be imposed. Given the aridity of
Colorado's climate, counties often require an emergency water source for fire
suppression on individual sites. Cisterns capable of holding around 2,000 gallons of
water are often placed on a property. This can be difficult due to site constraints or
terrain features. For this reason, Boulder County allows landowners to enter into a
community cistern program that is coordinated by the local fire district-money is
collected and a large 10-30,000 gallon tank will be placed in a location accessible to the
community. Clear Creek County requires that all structures 4,400 square feet or larger
must be equipped with an approved automatic sprinkler system.
Counties can also address their wildfire risk through voluntary planning efforts.
One of the most popular options is creating a Community Wildfire Protection Plan
(CWPP). CWPPs are a creature of the 2003 Healthy Forests Restoration Act (HFRA),
which placed a renewed emphasis on community planning by providing a variety of
benefits to communities that create a wildfire protection plan. CWPPs can be
performed at any scale-from small neighborhood and homeowner associations to
countywide. At the county level, all of the Front Range counties have completed or are
in the process of drafting CWPPs, including a final joint CWPP between Jefferson and
Douglas County. CWPPs help counties identify risk in terms of structural vulnerabilities,
access, and vegetation, and often prioritize mitigation areas for fuel management
programs. They may also address individual lots at highest risk or unique subdivision
constraints. The CWPP process brings together a number of stakeholders. These
networks have the potential to bridge common divides between community groups,
including fire officials, local landowners, government and land agencies (Ganz et al.
2007).
Boosting all county mitigation work are partnerships and education campaigns
that support or promote wildfire risk reduction. Boulder County began creating
partnerships in the late 1970s to form the Front Range Vegetation Management Pilot
Project, a task force that addressed problems of forest health associated with mountain
pine beetles. More recent partnerships include the Larimer County Coordinating Group
(LCCG) and Front Range Fuels Treatment Partnership (FRFTP), interagency groups
that consist of local, state, federal agencies, land-management agencies, private
landowners, conservation organizations, and other stakeholders. These types of
partnerships coordinate fuels management activities. FRFTP has conducted a
hazardous fuels assessment of conditions along the Front Range based on areas of low
to very high hazard, risk, and values. The assessments indicate that approximately
510,000 acres are high priority for treatment; 440,000 acres on National forests, and
70,000 acres on private land, an amount that totals over 1.5 million acres of land. The
Partnership continues to treat high-priority areas with funding received primarily through
competitive grants (Colorado State Forest Service, 2007). Another outreach and
education program is Firewise Communities. This national program brings together a
number of stakeholders, including homeowners, community leaders, planners,
developers, and fire officials. The program's recognition elements, Firewise
Communities/USA, has motivated more than 325 communities in 36 states to perform
voluntary measures to protect homes and promote homeowner responsibility through
safer community designs (2008). The program incorporates features such as fire-
resistant landscaping, fire-resistant building materials and attention to shared
community risk areas. Current Firewise Colorado communities in the Front Range
include Perry Park (Douglas County), Genesee (Jefferson County), and Windcliff
(Larimer County).
Counties may opt to employ additional tools to aid decision-making and wildfire
response. Some counties are coordinating voluntary fire response units through the
development of "Redzone" software-software that will create a database accessible to
all fire department. This system will link individual subdivision data into a countywide
system so when volunteer firefighters are called to respond, they can have the
necessary information at their fingertips. Other counties have or are considering
investments in lightning detection equipment for early tracking of wildfires in remote
areas. Boulder County's system illustrates this integration well. In 1992 a technical
team developed what is now known as the Wildfire Hazard Identification and Mitigation
System (WHIMS). WHIMS combines hazard assessment, forest management, land-
use planning, building safety, wildfire behavior, and fire suppression expertise with
geographic data management and analysis technologies. WHIMS uses data that
includes lot boundary and ownership, topography, fuel types, and site-specific hazard
information collected on each parcel. WHIMS identifies wildfire hazards for land
managers, fire officials, and decision makers, and builds in an educational component
for homeowners."
Throughout all of the mitigation options that Front Range counties employ, Teller
County noticeably lags behind in its implementation of wildfire regulations. What makes
Teller County different and why does it have the least regulated approach to wildfire
mitigation? These questions are particularly poignant given its high wildfire risk: not
only does Teller County have one of the highest incidences of dry lightning strikes
throughout the entire U.S., its development history has resulted in a slew of highly-
flammable structures. In the 1950's, 60's and 70's, Teller County experienced a quick
population boom due to the growing air force base in nearby Colorado Springs. Poorly
constructed homes that were never intended for permanent residency suddenly became
just that, and now Teller County has a number of vulnerable structures in wildfire-prone
areas with limited access (Garren 2008). In addition to highly vulnerable existing
structures, new development is not required to go through a wildfire mitigation
assessment. No defensible space, structural requirements, or other mitigation projects
6 Site-specific hazard data is collected on-site using a hazard-rating questionnaire for each parcel. The
questionnaire, developed with wildfire hazard experts, is filled out on-site by volunteer fire fighters
involving personal contact with homeowners whenever possible. This allows the resident to ask questions
and discuss the hazards and possible mitigation actions. In addition to educating homeowners during the
site visit, the fire fighter becomes more familiar with his/her district.
are necessary; building permits might only be denied on the grounds of access.
Explanations for this different approach vary. One former Teller County staff member
attributes the lack of regulation to the county's "failure to see the integration of wildfire
as part of the whole picture, and that residents and officials think that mitigation work
will jeopardize private property rights and economic resources." This former staff
member also points out the differences that Teller County has faced in comparison to
other counties such as Boulder, Douglas, and Jefferson. Staff resources, and finances
were a large part of the equation-during the seven years while trying to update the
county's regulations there was 100 percent turnover in the Board of County
Commissioners, and a constant struggle to retain planning staff. Another former county
official speculated that demographics play a role in the overall attitude that shuns
wildfire regulations. "Many people here don't understand overgrowth and still see forest
fires as a negative thing." There is also a "boot-strap mentality" in the
County-residents don't expect the government to do what they can do for themselves.
Others thought that the federal Forest Service posed one of the biggest obstacles.
Over half of Teller County is public land, meaning that large coordination efforts are
required for thinning projects but "the forest service has made it difficult to clear areas"
due to heavy regulations.
The Hayman Fire, however, was a turning point for Teller County. Just as it
prompted many other counties in the Front Range to take more action, Teller County
also began to address wildfire mitigation in a larger capacity. This occurred primarily
through homeowner engagements and voluntary efforts. One of its most active
homeowners, Curt Grina, stepped forward to create a Wildfire Assistance Center. Marti
Campbell, a Teller County resident who worked as the Center's employee says this
about it: "The Center initially started as an education program for residents. It provided
assistance and was a means of answering questions for people face to face. It was
extremely successful, facilitated a number of slash and chipper programs, and there
was even coordination with the local mine for looking at slash for reclamation projects.
The County was very cooperative between departments." Grina attributes the
program's success to being a non-regulatory entity, "The local government has very
little leverage in this environment. It really can't do much in our county; people are very
resistant to help from the government. The Resource center was not government
affiliated so people developed a level of trust." This level of trust, Grina explains, has
helped residents undertake a number of voluntary mitigation efforts. He claims that
their receptivity to the center to provide advice and support has helped residents
navigate through funding choices available to them and initiated a number of fuel
reduction projects.
MISSING PIECES: WHAT MITIGATION FAILS TO ADDRESS
With or without regulation, the six Front Range counties have been figuring out ways to
mitigate their risks to wildfire. But is this enough to warrant continued development in
areas at high risk to wildfire? Defensible space requirements, tree thinning and forest
treatment, incorporation of non-flammable building materials, interagency coordination,
and public outreach programs can help reduce the risk of wildfire damage to people and
property. Yet development patterns, public attitudes, and inadequate staffing resources
can complicate mitigation implementation efforts. Adding more complexity are risks that
continue to persist: climate change is increasing the likelihood of severe drought and
hotter summers throughout the entire western U.S.; more people living in the WUI leads
to more wildfire ignitions; mitigation can be time-consuming and difficult to enforce.
Other significant gaps-including who pays for fire protection and recovery
efforts--underlie this entire discussion. Wildfire disasters burden an entire community.
Development decisions that continue to put people and community assets in fire-prone
areas must reconsider the larger economic, social, and environmental risks.
Land Ownership, Housing Density, and Property Rights
On average, 85 percent of wildfires that start on state and private lands in Colorado are
human caused (Colorado Division of Emergency Management 2000). The ignition
sources are manifold: downed power lines or railroad sparks, arson, debris burning,
recreational carelessness, or runaway campfires (Schwab and Meck 2005). Structures
in the WUI also act as ignition sources when a fire starts from within and spreads to the
exterior of the house. As wildfire mitigation specialist Eric Philips of Boulder County
comments, "Most people don't think about what happens if their house catches on fire
and spreads to the surrounding forest." This was unfortunately the case in 1989 with
the Panorama Fire in Garfield and Eagle Counties--two WUI areas west of the Front
Range. A fire ignited inside an unoccupied house, burning the structure completely and
spreading to the surrounding areas. Despite no other structures being lost, resources
were required from federal, state, county and local fire agencies. But the implications
are clear: allowing more people to move into the WUI increases the likelihood that more
wildfires will occur (Keeley 2003).
Keeping people from moving into WUI areas, however, is difficult. Archaic land-
use laws, such as the Mining Act of 1872, puts counties such as Boulder, Clear Creek,
and Jefferson at odds with restricting growth in high hazard areas. These counties fall
at the edge of the Colorado Mineral Belt--a broad area stretching northeast from the
San Juan Mountains in southwestern Colorado to the Colorado Front Range near
Boulder where there are many old mining claims. Originally given to families for rights
to minerals in the late 1800s, these claims allow development by right. Complicating
matters, these lots were platted in irregular shapes based on the mining claims,
resulting in long, thin parcels being located in the middle of public land, making access
difficult and terrain inhospitable. Many areas are no longer viable for mining, but land
values and the attractive setting now make these areas appealing for homebuilding in
the eyes of those who inherit the claims (Anon. 2007). The existing regulatory context
prohibits the counties from denying development without costly takings or other litigation
fees.
Other development patterns exacerbate wildfire risk and contribute to higher
resources for wildfire protection. A 1972 Colorado law, Senate Bill 35, exempts
developers from county subdivision requirements if parcels they are selling are 35 acres
or larger. This law has often resulted in 35-acre lots scattered throughout the state. It
may seem that such lower densities would reduce the number of homes requiring
protection in the WUI but in fact this density requires more road infrastructure,
encourages longer driveways, and allows a wider variety of structures within the WUI
(CSFS 2007). The resulting scattered pattern and varied access routes make it more
difficult for fire fighters to protect every structure, especially as traveling embers precede
flames.
Each of the counties is also faced with land ownership patterns that make wildfire
mitigation more challenging. Many of the Front Range counties contain state or national
forest within their jurisdiction, some as much as half the land area or more.7 Private
homes in the WUI that abut publicly managed lands require a coordinated approach to
fuel management. As witnessed in Teller County, tensions arise between fuel-clearing
priorities of the state and what the private property owner deem a risk (Grina 2008).
Additionally, many counties can have seasonal or absentee property owners resulting in
an overgrown lot that poses an additional risk to adjacent homeowners (Campbell
2008).
The True Economic Costs Associated with Wildfires
The current economic structure does not discourage-and, in fact, subsidizes-
development in wildfire-prone areas. Property owners, developers, and counties all
benefit from allowing growth in WUI areas. Counties receive increased property tax
revenues, developers and homebuyers find more affordable land values, and
meanwhile property owners can expect the same level of fire protection services as they
would in more urbanized areas. A recent study by the Office of Inspector General found
7 In Larimer County, 870,775 acres are privately owned; 645,400 acres are managed by the USFS;
143,100 acres are managed by Rocky Mountain National Park (RMNP); 27,600 acres are managed by
the Bureau of Land Management (BLM); and 2,725 acres are managed by CSFS. Additionally, there are
an estimated 172,700 acres of private land intermixed within the forest boundary (Larimer County, 2006).
Teller County has a similar mix: a slight majority (51 percent) is private; the rest is managed and owned
by the USFS (35 percent), BLM (8 percent), State Park (4 percent), and State (2 percent). Of Clear
Creek County's 396 square miles, only 23 percent of the land or 93.6 square miles is in private
ownership. The remainder is in public ownership. The Forest Service is the largest public landowner with
266 square miles, or 67 percent of the total county land area.
that the bulk of the federal government's wildfire costs are spent on the protection of
private property built in the WUI (2007). Forest Service managers estimate that the
total cost of fighting large forest fires to protect private homes abutting Forest Service
lands accounted for 50 to 95 percent of all costs, ranging from $547 million to $1 billion
in 2003 and 2004 (Headwaters Economics, 2007). Federal fire budgets consistently
total more than $1 billion annually (Kennedy, 2006). Colorado confirms this spending
trend--a recent publication by the Colorado State Forest Service states that escalating
firefighting costs are due to the state's expanding WUI (2007).
Rather than local jurisdictions bearing the costs of their development actions,
state emergency declarations provide emergency funding to communities for recovery.
Since 1987 Colorado governors have declared wildfire emergencies almost every year,
with multiple occurrences in many years. The fire season of 2002 was so extreme,
primarily due to the Hayman fire, that the state received a presidential disaster
declaration, making it eligible for federal assistance. According to the Colorado Office
of Emergency Management (2007), Colorado also received Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) Fire Suppression Assistance/Fire Management
Assistance from 1994 through 2006 for a number of fires, including the Buffalo Creek,
Hi Meadow, Hayman, Missionary Ridge, Grizzly Gulch, South Canyon, Big Elk, and Old
State fires. This level of financial support is essential for the recovery process, but
circumvents the local jurisdiction being made accountable for development that was put
in harm's way.
Insurance companies also conceal the true cost of building in fire-prone areas.
Wildfire losses remain low because insurance companies spread their fire losses
among all other policyholders with similar protection. Moreover, wildfire loss is a low
priority on an insurance company's list. Among insured losses in Colorado, hail
consistently ranks as the top catastrophe.8 The Rocky Mountain Insurance Information
Association shows insured losses for hail in Colorado exceeded 1.7 billion dollars
between 1984 and 2004. Wildfire was a minor 70 million dollars, and ranked only once
(2002) among the top catastrophes during this same twenty-year time period (Colorado
Division of Emergency Management 2007). Additionally, a large amount of resources
are devoted to protecting homes by state and federal funds and therefore avoiding
losses-in contrast to the $38 million in insured losses for the Hayman fire, the state
spent almost $40 million for wildfire suppression and an estimated $75 million for post-
fire rehabilitation costs on federal and nonfederal land (State of Colorado 2003).
Enforcement and Reliance on Homeowner Voluntarism
As wildfire risk exposure increases for those in the WUI, reducing one's vulnerability
becomes paramount. The Clear Creek County draft CWPP (2008) states this point
succinctly: "The single-most effective tool any community has in its arsenal to reduce
the threat of wildfire are motivated homeowners who take action to reduce the
ignitability of their homes and mitigate hazardous fuels to create an effective defensible
space in and around where they live." With plenty of existing homes already in the WUI
prior to smarter fire regulations that now require defensible space and fire-resistant
8 In general terms, the insurance industry defines a catastrophe as "a natural disaster that causes a
certain dollar amount, currently set at $25 million in insured damage. From 1986-2005, hurricanes and
tropical storms accounted for 47.5 percent of insured catastrophic losses, tornadoes 24.5 percent, winter
storms 7.8 percent, terrorism 7.7 percent, earthquakes 6.7 percent, wind, hail, and flood 2.8 percent, and
catastrophic fires at 2.3 percent." Flooding is the most common natural disaster, however coverage for
flood (defined as rising water) is excluded under most standard homeowners policies. (CDEM State
Hazard Mitigation Plan)
building materials, community decision makers are dependent upon homeowners to
voluntarily mitigate.
How seriously homeowners take their wildfire risk, however, is unclear.
Research indicates that homeowners often underestimate their individual risk to wildfire
(Steelman 2008). By the same token, the perceived cumulative risk of wildfire to an
entire community can be much higher. This phenomenon has been dubbed the wildfire
mitigation paradox, and places a higher burden on community decision makers than
individual property owners. However, given the large amount of influence a homeowner
can have on their risks, some would argue that the primary and ultimate responsibility
for home wildfire protection lies with private homeowners, not public land management
agencies (or taxpayers) (Cohen, 1999). Resistance may also stem from uncertainty
about how to dispose of cleared vegetation because homeowners are uncertain about
what to do with it. Open burning is a last resort option because it creates unwelcome
smoke, and in some areas is banned outright. Many wood-chipping programs exist but
clearing and mitigating takes time and costs money--homeowners may only have to
pay $200 to $300 for mitigation assessment plans performed by wildfire specialists, but
the actual cutting down of trees or replacing a roof can run in the thousands of dollars
(Dwyer 2008; Philips 2008). Grant money is available for fuel clearing, but navigating
this process can be cumbersome (Campbell 2008; Winkler 2008).
Even if counties' mitigation measures are effective, enforcement and re-
inspection of fire mitigation measures is an issue that plagues community planners, land
managers, and fire officials. Who will ensure that defensible space is maintained is an
unanswered question in every county. Wildfire is different from other natural hazards
because it requires ongoing attention to vegetation. Counties hope that their education
efforts pay off, but it is ambitious to assume that every homeowner will continue to
maintain their defensible space in accordance with the original mitigation plan. Douglas
County is currently struggling with this issue while they go through an update to their
wildfire regulations (Dwyer 2008). Boulder County admits that it simply does not have
resources or staff to coordinate this undertaking (Philips 2008). Despite their
successes, it is also worth noting that CWPPs are not regulatory. There is no legal
requirement to implement the recommendations, no matter how well crafted
communities make them. Further, CWPPs are in place after development has already
been built. Therefore, development mistakes of the past are difficult to correct.
Perceptions of nature can also make mitigation work difficult. People are deeply
hesitant to cut trees, even if it creates healthier forest conditions. Homeowners grow
fond of the aesthetic quality of trees--and the privacy that comes with them. Eric
Phillips admits his struggles with some homeowners, even educated ones. "One
community [in Boulder County] is notorious-they plant trees as soon as I leave.
Theoretically we could take them to court over it, because they aren't following the
mitigation plan, but they have so much time and money on their hands there's really not
much I can do about it. They're dead set against anything I try to do." Phillips
emphasizes the level of attention that planners must devote to the tree preservation
issue. '"When marking trees on a lot it is always a balancing act of how many trees to
keep, where they are, who wants what for what reasons. We're concerned about the
level of screening and visibility." Boulder County now tries to standardize things as
much as possible. "Before I came out here [mitigation work] was hit or miss and it
wasn't getting applied consistently. People were coming in for final inspection...and
trees weren't marked. I found someone really needs to be paying attention along the
way. Without a good plan people will deviate. People will voluntarily do defensible
space and it's all hodge-podge, hit or miss. They don't want to cut 6-8 inch diameter
trees. They don't have the time, money, or experience." For similar reasons, Douglas
County has started working with developers prior to homes being built so that tree
thinning takes place before people ever see their lots. Steve Dwyer, of Douglas County,
notes, "People can't fall in love with trees that aren't there."
Climate Change
No matter how well a community mitigates, experts say that wildfire trends in the past
ten years are worrisome (Smalley 2008). As with most natural events, wildfire appears
to be cyclical. In regions such as the Front Range, the annual number of wildfires
peaks every six to eight years (Larimer County, 2006). Records show that the most
recent cycle has been disrupted and wildfires trends are on a new trajectory of
increased frequency and severity. The National Interagency Fire Center recorded six of
the ten worst fire seasons recorded in U.S. history in terms of acres burned occurring
since 2000 (2008). Trends in Colorado are no different. Wildfires are greater in
frequency and more acres are burning.
Number of Annual Wildfires in Colorado (1978-2007)
Coupled with this trend is fire officials' concern for changes in wildfire behavior
and severity--in other words, they burn hotter and behave less predictably (Smalley
2008). Old suppression techniques are no longer satisfactory for combating the heat,
force, and size of the flames as seen in recent years. Changing ecosystem conditions
throughout the West also contribute to the intensity and number of wildfires. Droughts
in the Southwest persist and forests are plagued with invasive species. Both the pine
beetle and ips beetle have left large swaths of tree stands dead and vulnerable to
flames. Other invasive species, such as mistletoe, allow fires to have "fuel
ladders"--fuel extending from ground to tree crown, enabling surface fires to turn into
large conflagrations quickly by spreading flames vertically (CSFS 2007).
Climate change predictions also point to an extended fire season by bringing a
longer, hotter summer season to the southwestern region of the United States
(Johansen 2006). Research cited by the University of Wisconsin links larger wildfires
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with a recent increase in global temperatures. This research draws on a 2006 study
published in Science that compared two periods of fire activity in the western U.S.: from
1970 to 1986 and 1987 to 2003. During this time, the average spring-summer
temperature in the West rose .9 degrees Celsius. The study revealed that large fires
(over 1,000 acres) during the second period were four times more common, burned 6.5
times as much area, and burned on average for five times as many days.
CREATING MEANINGFUL WUI POLICY
Mitigation can only go so far in counteracting increasing wildfire risks, and it fails
entirely to address burgeoning WUls. None of the six counties except Boulder has yet
addressed its growing WUI in a way that connects its county's growth management
goals to its wildfire risks. On the contrary, counties have been welcoming growth and
satisfying themselves with wildfire mitigation plans and regulations. Reversing the
substantial threats to personal safety, private property, and county budgets, will require
decision makers to re-evaluate their long-term economic costs associated with WUI
growth and fire protection, and design policies to effectively limit or halt development in
wildfire-prone areas. Both state and local plans must consider hazard avoidance rather
than relying solely on wildfire mitigation as a solution.
Creating stronger links between long-range planning and hazard mitigation
efforts aimed at avoiding wildfire threat would be an important starting point for county
officials (Steinberg and Burby 2002). A 2001 survey conducted by the Institute for
Business & Home Safety revealed that many jurisdictions do not integrate their land-use
planning with hazard mitigation and disaster safety planning (Anon 2002). Colorado is
one of only ten states that require some level of hazard mitigation planning, as
witnessed by their annually updated state natural hazards plan. The plan's wildfire
component, however, focuses heavily on mitigation and lacks a land-use planning
discussion that considers hazard avoidance. Similarly, Front Range counties that
address natural hazards in their comprehensive plans focus primarily on mitigation
efforts. This is due in part to wildfire mitigation plans being referred to specialists, fire
officials, and the chief building official-community planners are not engaged except for
application approvals. Local and state departments that are required to plan for
hazards, including Emergency Management Divisions and Fire Departments, often do
so independently. This results in poor communication between development
departments and local agencies (Steelman 2003). Planners must be better integrated
into the hazard planning process, rather than leaving this component to emergency
management and fire officials. Legislation could advance these links. For example,
Senate Bill 35 requires that any person or entity subdividing a property into parcels of
35 acres or less on unincorporated land must submit geologic or geotechnical reports to
the county as part of the preliminary plat application process. Extending this to include
wildfire hazards would require planners to more fully consider this hazard during
development reviews and give them authority to deny development based on high
wildfire risk.
Land ownership, growth management in the WUI, and archaic land-use laws
must also be revisited. Boulder County's land transfer program should serve as a
model for other county planning departments. Boulder County has been engaged in a
ten-year land swap with the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), Boulder County Parks
and Open Space Department, the CSFS and USFS. This process has ensured that the
greater portion of the city is surrounded by open space and the WUI has been limited
(Philips, 2008). With greater connectivity between publicly owned or managed lands, it
is easier for agencies to both a) undertake large-scale fuel reduction projects, and b)
keep more people out of harm's way by decreasing the amount of private property
scattered throughout wildland-prone areas. Other county growth management
programs in the West could also be replicated. An Urban Growth Boundary or Transfer
of Development Rights (TDRs) system, such as those in Pitkin County, Colorado and
Teton County, Wyoming would curb WUI growth. These growth management schemes
enable counties to downzone rural areas to 160-acre lots, decreasing the number of
homes allowed in a WUI and increasing fire fighting capability by lowering the burden of
structures requiring protection during wildfire suppression. These programs also result
in increased density closer to the urban town center, clustering homes and
concentrating infrastructure. Counties can also address land-use laws such as the
1872 Mining Act by implementing backcountry regulations that limit house size and ban
utility extensions. Pitkin County initiated this in the 1990's, avoiding numerous mining
claims being sold as future home sites (Anon. 2007).
If people choose to build in the high-risk areas, the full cost of development
should be assessed through impact fees or taxes. Currently, local governments receive
tax dollars for new development, but bear relatively little of wildfire post-rehabilitation
and recovery costs. Roger Kennedy, former director of the National Park Service,
argues that one of the most effective types of sprawl-limiting policy would be to increase
tax revenues--which would also increase individual responsibility among homeowners
and reduce deaths in wildfires-accompanied by the idea that Congress stop allowing
the IRS to accept any deductions for interest on mortgage loans made to finance
construction or ownership of houses constructed or bought in a high-wildfire risk area
(2006). A further step would be that federal and state agencies would require local
governments to contribute more money for wildfire disasters from their own county
budgets. Recent planning enabling legislation passed in Colorado (House Bill 07-1168)
authorizes the creation of "forest improvement districts," special districts that protect
communities from wildfires and improves the condition of forests in the district. This
legislation is a way of combining resources and special taxing authority across
jurisdictions to mitigate wildfire risk through fuel management programs and incentives
to landowners to mitigate risks on their property. It should go further, however, to apply
local taxes to wildfire suppression so that residents are more directly aware of the high
costs of home protection in the WUI.
More resources must also be invested in wildfire risk prevention, rather than just
mitigation and firefighting. A survey conducted during the summer of 2001 asked
Colorado residents living in the WUI about their views towards wildfire management and
willingness-to-pay (WTP) values for prescribed burning. Results indicate that residents
in Colorado living near public lands are aware that fire is a natural process in their area
and are in favor of prescribed burning for reducing wildfire risk. More importantly,
survey respondents said they would be willing to pay an annual tax for prescribed fire
undertaken on the public lands near their homes. If the public living in the WUI were
taxed an additional amount for prescribed burning, the burden of wildfire management
would no longer predominantly lie in the hands of the general taxpayers (Kaval et al.
2006). Other mechanisms that would increase awareness to homeowners regarding
wildfire risk include fire disclosure zones, such as those in California, and insurance
rates that are linked with wildfire risk.9 These would provide signals to homeowners
about their level of wildfire risk exposure. Insurance companies and counties alike
would also benefit from using predictive wildfire models and changing ecosystem
conditions to consider their full risks, rather than relying on historical data. This will
provide decision makers with a better awareness of how wildfire risk will increase and
where hazard areas will expand.
CONCLUSION
When Colorado governor Bill Owens convened a task force in 2001 to address the
growing wildfire problem in the state of Colorado, the appointed group produced a
report that outlined four potential hazard mitigation approaches: 1) acting on the
hazard-fire prevention actions upon fuels or ignition sources to eliminate the hazard or
risk of ignition and fast, effective fire control actions that reduce the threat of a wildfire
turning into a natural disaster; 2) redirecting the hazard-fire control actions to keep an
encroaching wildfire away from improvements, more vulnerable areas or higher value
areas; 3) interacting with the hazard-vegetation management, fuel breaks or fire safety
provisions incorporated into building codes or development regulations which result in
an improvement being better able to survive a wildfire, and; 4) avoiding the hazard-
9 A pilot program in Colorado with State Farm shows promising steps (Steelman 2003). When a property
changes ownership, insurance companies might require adequate mitigation prior to re-insuring the
home. This may involve defensible space improvements and/or roofing upgrades to replace flammable
shingles. The next step would be for insurance companies to base premium rates on extra risk for
buildings located in the interface and reflect wildfire safety measures by homeowners in lowered
premiums.
greenbelt or open space projects which create beneficial land-uses while restricting
development of wildfire-prone areas (Colorado, 2000). Since this report was issued,
state and local agencies throughout the Colorado Front Range have acted in earnest on
points 1, 2, and 3. Successful fuel treatment partnerships, improved interagency
coordination, biomass collection sites, defensible space and building code
requirements, improved access, water availability, and other fire safety provisions all
evidence a strong commitment to wildfire mitigation approaches. Point 4, hazard
avoidance, however, is largely absent from the Front Range agenda, with the exception
of Boulder County. Better planning in the form of sprawl-limiting policies and land-use
law reform, would slow the swelling costs of wildfire suppression in the WUI and risk
fewer lives--new housing developments may seem attractive to local officials in the
short run, but over time they are a financial drain and place more community assets at
risk. Small, poorly funded volunteer fire departments are ill equipped to fight
increasingly large wildfires, and tightening federal budgets cannot continue to absorb
escalating WUI costs. In any case, taxpayers should not be subsidizing a portion of the
population's preference to live in a fire-prone environment.
The 2007 fire season made it very clear that wildfire is not a hazard of the past.
California, Montana, and even areas with historically low wildfires frequency such as the
Georgia coast, saw unprecedented levels of wildfire activity. The National Interagency
Fire Center (NIFC) reported that over 85,000 wildfires and more than 9.3 million acres
burned in 2007 throughout the United States. Threats to personal safety, structure
losses, state costs, and community asset exposure will continue to rise due to
increasing wildfire risk along the Colorado Front Range. Reliance on fire suppression is
a dangerous and costly response to the growing WUI situation. Barriers will continue to
exist but community decision makers should be communicating these trade-offs to the
public as part of their outreach and education efforts in order for the public to better
understand who is bearing the true costs and risks of WUI growth.

REFERENCES
Anon. -------. 2002. "Feds Charge Forestry Worker with Starting Fire," CNN.com, June
17. Available at:
http://archives.cnn.com/2002/US/06/16/colorado.fires/index.html.
-------. 2003. "Science and Policy Brief: Summary of the Hayman Fire, Colorado: June
8-July 2, 2002." The Wilderness Society. March (6). Available at:
http://www.wilderness.org/Library/Documents/upload/Summary-of-Hayman-Fire-
CO-PDF.pdf
-------. 2007. "The New Land Rush." High Country News, September 3.
-------. 2007. "Up in Smoke? Lessons From the California Fire." The Why Files.
University of Wisconsin, November 1. Available at
http://whyfiles.org/269harms_way/index.php?g=2.txt
-------. 2007. "Colorado Summary." Headwaters Economics. Available at:
http://headwaterseconomics.org/index.php
Boulder County Wildfire Mitigation Group, Colorado. 2001. The WHIMS Manual March
16. Available at http://www.co.boulder.co.us/lu/wildfire/.
Campbell, Martha. 2008. Personal communication.
Chadwick, Michael. 2008. Personal communication.
Clear Creek Fire Authority. 2008. Available at http://www.clearcreekfire.com/
Cohen, Jack. 1999. "USDA Forest Service Paper: Reducing the Wildland Fire Threat to
Homes: Where and How Much?" Paper presented at the Fire Economics
Symposium in San Diego, California, April 12. Available at:
http://www.saveamericasforests.org/congress/Fire/Cohen.htm
Colorado State Forest Service. 2002. Wildfire Mitigation Plan (State of Colorado
Division of Emergency Management). Available at:
http://www.dola.state.co.us/dem/mitigation/2001 mitigation report. pdf
Colorado State Forest Service. 2007. Report on the Health of Colorado's Forests.
Available at:
http://csfs.colostate.edu/library/pdfs/csfs/07_Forest_Health_Report_web.pdf
Dennis, F.C. 2003. "Creating Wildfire Defensible Space Zones," Colorado State
University, no. 6.302. (Colorado: Colorado State Forest Service). Available at
http://www.ext.colostate.edu/PUBS/natres/06302.html
Douglas County, Colorado. 2007. "Community Development Wildfire Mitigation."
Available at http://www.douglas.co.us/community/wildfire/.
Dwyer, Steve. 2008. Personal communication.
Firewise Communities/USA. 2008. Available at http://www.firewise.org/.
Ganz, David, Austin Troy, and David Saah. 2007. "Community Involvement in Wildfire
Hazard Mitigation and Management: Community Based Fire Management, Fire
Safe Councils and Community Wildfire Protection Plans." In Austin Troy and
Roger G. Kennedy, eds., Living on the Edge: Economic, Institutional and
Management Perspectives on Wildfire Hazard in the Urban Interface (Oxford,
UK: JAI Press), 143-164.
Garren, Jean. 2008. Personal communication.
Genessee. 2007. Genesee Foundation Revised Architectural Standards. Available at:
http://geneseefoundation.org/ARC/07%20ARC%20standardsBoard%20Approved
%20Final%20_4_.pdf
Grina, Curt. 2008. Personal communication.
Institute for Business Home and Safety. 2002. "Are We Planning Safer Communities?"
Available at: http://www.ibhs.org/publications/downloads/289.pdf
Johansen, Bruce. 2006. Global Warming in the 21st Century, vol. 1: Our Evolving
Climate Crisis (Westport, CT: Praeger).
Kaval, Pamela, John Loomis, and Andy Seidl. 2006. "Willingness-to-pay for Prescribed
Fire in the Colorado (USA) Wildland Urban Interface" Science Direct. October 6.
Keeley, Jon. 2007. "Human Influence on California Fire Regimes" ed. Western
Ecological Research Center, Publication Brief for Resource Managers, July
(USGS). Available at: http://www.werc.usgs.gov/pubbriefs/keeleypbjul2007.pdf
Kennedy, Roger G. 2006. Wildfire and Americans: How to Save Lives, Property, and
Your Tax Dollars. (New York: Hill and Wang.)
Kent, Brian, Wayne D. Sheppard, and Deborah J. Shields. 2000. '"The Colorado Front
Range Ecosystem Management Research Project: Accomplishments to Date." In
Smith, Helen Y., ed. 2000. The Bitterroot Ecosystem Management Research
Project: What we have learned: symposium proceedings; 1999 May 18-20;
Missoula, MT. Proc. RMRS-P-17.
Kent, Brian, Gebert, K., McCaffrey, S., Martin, W., Calkin, D., Schuster, E., Martin, I.,
Bender, H.W., Alward, G., Kumagai, Y., Cohn, P.J., Carroll, M., Williams, D.
Ekarius, C. 2003 "Social and Economic Issues of the Hayman Fire" USDA Forest
Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114.
Martin, Wade, Carol Raish, and Brian Kent. eds. 2008. Wildfire Risk: Human
Perceptions and Management Implications (Washington DC: Resources for the
Future).
McGuire, William, lan Mason, Christopher Kilburn. 2002. Natural Hazards and
Environmental Change (Amsterdam: Springer Netherlands).
National Interagency Fire Center. 2008. Available at
http://www.nifc.gov/fire_info/fire_stats.htm.
National Climatic Data Center. 2008. "Climate of 2007 Wildfire Season Summary."
Available at http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/climate/researchl2007/fire07.html
Philips, Eric. 2008. Personal communication.
Pyne, Stephen. 1982. Fire in America (Princeton: Princeton University Press).
.. 2001. Fire: A Brief History (Seattle: University of Washington Press).
Schwab, James, and Stuart Meck. 2005. Planning for Wildfires. Planning Advisory
Service 529/530 (Chicago: American Planning Association).
Smalley, James. 2008. '"Wildfires in the United States: Future Trends and Challenges."
Paper presented at Forest Fires: Economical and Environmental Impacts, Sintra
- Centro Cultural Olga Cadaval, Portugal. April 17. On file with author.
Steelman, Toddi, and Devona Bell. 2004. Jefferson County Colorado Case Study. US
Department of Forestry, NC State University, November 2004. Available at
http://www.ncsu.edu/project/wildfire/Colorado/jefferson/jefferson.html.
•-. 2004. Boulder County, Colorado Case Study. US Department of Forestry, NC
State University, September 12, 2004. Available at
http://www.ncsu.edu/project/wildfire/Colorado/boulder/boulder.html.
•-. 2008. "Addressing the Mitigation Paradox at the Community Level." In Wade E.
Martin, Carol Raish, and Brian Kent, eds., Wildfire Risk: Human Perceptions and
Management Implications (Washington DC: Resources for the Future), 64-80.
Steen, Harold. 2004. The U.S. Forest Service: A History (Seattle: University of
Washington Press).
Steinberg, Michele and Raymond Burby, April 2002. Growing Safe. Planning. Chicago:
American Planning Association.
Teller County, Colorado. 2007. Community Wildfire Protection Plan 2005. Available at
http://www.co.teller.co.us/.
Troy, Austin and Roger G. Kennedy, eds. 2007. Living on the Edge: Economic,
Institutional and Management Perspectives on Wildfire Hazard in the Urban
Interface. Vol. 6, Advances in the Economics of Environmental Resources.
(Oxford, UK: JAI Press).
Winkler, Greg. 2008. Personal communication.
Wuerthner, George, ed. 2006. The Wildfire Reader: A Century of Failed Forest Policy
(Sausalito, CA: Foundation for Deep Ecology).
United States Forest Service. 2008. National Database of State and Local Wildfire
Hazard Mitigation Programs. Available at
http://www.wildfireprograms.usda.gov/index.html.
APPENDIX A: COLORADO WILDFIRE RED ZONE MAP
Interface Areas of High Wildfire Risk in Colorado
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APPENDIX B: FRONT RANGE COUNTY RISKS TO WILDFIRE
(rounded to
nearest 1,000)
Percent of acres
ranked moderate
to high hazard for
wildfire risk (1999)
Forests Requiring
fire risk mitigation
and/or forest
restoration (acres)
Private land
(percent of total)
Asset Exposure
($ billions)
Developed Square
Miles in the WUI
Undeveloped
Square Miles in the
WUI
Percent Developed
Homes
Percent Second
Homes (Head)
Subdivisions
located in the WUI
(1999)
Structures with
high exposure
Significant Fire
Events (Note:
some fires repeat
across counties.
Statistics are for
the entire fire
incident, not per
county.)
20%
164,211
58%
33
57.1
37.8
60%
5409
25%
84 (17,025
acres)
23,700
households;
2,700
businesses
-Lefthand
Canyon,
1988: 2,500
acres)
-Black Tiger,
1989:
$10,000,000,
44 structures,
1,778 acres
-Olde Stage,
1990:10
structures,
3,000 acres
-Eldorado,
2000:
$2,000,000,
29%
66,784
59%
(Not
available)
22.6
36.6
38%
3529
19%
22
3,500
households;
600
businesses
-St. Mary's,
2007: 1
structure
36%
192,479
42%
22
10.5
10.9
49%
(Not
available)
18%
232 (109,000
acres)
25,600
households;
2,100
businesses
-Hayman,
2002:
137,760
acres, 5
deaths, 16
injuries, 600
structures
-Schoonover,
2002: 3,862
acres, 12
structures, 1
bridge, 2
njuries
-Cherokee
Ranch Fire,
2003: 1,200
57%
252,222
73%
58
14.3
20.2
42%
4526
11%
102
37,000
households;
4,000
businesses
-Buffalo
Creek 1996:
$3835,000,
10 structures,
12,000 acres
-Hi Meadow,
2000: 51
structures,
10,800 acres
-Eldorado,
2000:
$2,000,000,
1,000 acres
-Hayman,
2002:
137,760
22%
272,162
60%
25
39.5
96
29%
5564
50%
200
(148,000
acres)
5,500
households
-Bobcat
Gulch,
2000: 18
structures,
10,600
acres
-Big Elk,
2004: 4,413
acres, 1
airtanker, 3
deaths
Picnic
Rock, 2004:
3,908 acres,
1 home
32%
137,227
61%
2.4
21.3
42.5
33%
4854
17%
58 (22,810
acres)
(Not
available)
-Hayman,
2002:
137,760
acres, 5
deaths, 16
njuries, 600
structures
Communities
ranked extreme
and very high risk
Hazard Overlay
Zoning District of
High Wildfire
Hazard Area
Subdivision
Regulations (for
new and remodels)
Defensible Space
requirements
Driveway and
Access
requirements
Links to permit
process
1,000 acres
-Overland,
2003: 12
homes, 3,439
acres
-Eldorado
Walker
Ranch, 2000:
1,061 acres
Lefthand
Canyon,
Boulder
Mountain,
Gold Hill-
Town of Gold
Hill, Gold Run
Subdivision,
Rowena and
Snowbound
area, Four
Mile-Rim
Road area,
Logan Mill,
Wallstreet,
Summerville,
Emerson
Gulch Arroyo
Chico, Indian
Hills (Upper
ndian Hills,
Lower Indian
Hills, 285
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No; Wildfire
Hazard
Point
System may
require
further
mitigation
steps
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
acres, 2
homes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
acres, 5
deaths, 16
injuries, 600
structures
-Schoonover,
2002: 3,862
acres, 12
structures, 1
bridge, 2
injuries
Willow Brook,
Willow
Springs
South, Red
Rocks, areas
of Golden
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
No
COUNTY BOULDER CLEAR DOUGLAS JEFFERSON LARIMER TELLERCREEK I
Building Materials
Water
considerations
Slash and Mulch
program
Specific Wildfire
coordinator/
specialist
Voluntary programs
Education tools
Groups
CWPPs completed
or in progress
Firewise
Communities
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Boulder
County
Wildfire
Mitigation
Group
Lefthand,
Gold Hill,
Four Mile,
Boulder
Mountain
Fire
Protection
Districts
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Clear Creek
county
(draft)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Perry Park,
Roxborough
park South
Platte, Pine
Ridge
Subdivision
Perry Park
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Golden Gate
Fire, West
Metro Fire,
Inter-Canyon
Fire, Indian
Hills Fire
Protection
Districts,
Fairmount
Fire, Golden
Fire, Elk
Creek, Harris
park, South
Platte, Lower
North Fork,
Evergreen
Genesee
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Larimer
County
Coor-
dinating
Group
Larimer
County,
Bucksin
Heights,
East Portal,
Little Valley
HOA,
Poudre Fire
Authority,
Crystal
Lakes,
Magic Sky,
Red Feather
Lakes,
Shambhala
Mountain
Center,
Estes Park,
Ben
Delatour
Boy Scout
Ranch,
Loveland,
Town of
Berthoud,
Poudre
Canyon,
Rist
Canyon,
Meadow-
dale Hills,
Glen Haven
Windcliff
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Pikes Peak
Wildfire
Prevention
Partnership
Teller
County,
Colorado
Mountain
Estates
Sources: Front Range Fuels Treatment Partnership: Living With Fire: Communities and Restoring
Forests, May 2006; United States Census Bureau, Population Division (Retrieved on 2008-03-27);
Colorado State Forest Service and Office of Emergency Management; Headwaters Economics
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APPENDIX C: WILDFIRE HAZARD IN COLORADO
.Frs in Cl d on S teLand byYarfom178t 20
Acres Burned
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
1990
1989
1988
1987
1986
1985
1984
1983
1982
1981
1980
1979
1978
Source: Colorado State Forest Service 2007
Year
1,351
3,294
2,014
1826
2,471
3,409
2,966
2,043
1,987
1,349
1,605
2,499
2,224
3,158
1,267
1,048
1,449
1,475
1,767
1,722
1,194
1,337
985
631
831
1,127
1,537
1,724
869
362
Number of
Fires
20,739
201,809
14,446
15,239
23,308
244,252
45,816
76,288
33,256
10,282
16,703
49,498
32,011
52125
3,526
4,158
6,576
9,825
56,732
33,037
24,208
30,247
25,343
12,913
11,752
10,184
9,835
18,828
3,139
13,085
APPENDIX D: WILDFIRE HAZARDS IN THE UNITED STATES
Total0Fire and Aresundin
Year
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
1990
Number of
Fires
85,705
96,385
66,552
77,534
85,943
88,458
84,079
122,827
93,702
81,043
89,517
115,025
130,019
114,049
97,031
103,830
116,953
122,763
Acres
Burned
9,328,045
9,873,745
8,686,753
6,790,692
4,918,088
6,937,584
3,555,138
8,422,237
5,661,976
2,329,709
3,672,616
6,701,390
2,315,730
4,724,014
2,310,420
2,457,665
2,237,714
5,452,874
Source: National Interagency Fire Center
http://www.nifc.gov/fire_info/fire_stats.htm
Five Aqencv Total ($)
Source: CO DEM 2007 Hazard Assessment Report
Year
Fire Suppr n Costs f
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
TOTAL
I
890,233,000
1,326,138,000
1,661,314,000
917,800,000
1,362,367,000
523,468,000
328,526,000
256,000,000
679,167,600
340,050,000
845,262,000
7,804,187,600
I
